



# NGO Development Center

Strategic Plan 2010 - 2014

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## 1. Introduction

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In response to the TOR, set by NDC, a strategic planning process appropriate to NDC's mode of operation has been conducted in an effort to develop and formulate NDC's strategic plan for the coming five years (2010 - 2014). The plan will render NDC more capable in planning and implementing its programs and activities that are consistent with its values, vision, and mission. Simultaneously, it will facilitate enhanced coordination and programming capacity while enabling more appropriate, efficient, and professional programs as well as institutional management of individual activities. This plan was accomplished upon the completion of a strategic planning workshop accompanied with other activities designed to revisit (and reformulate, if needed) the vision, strategies and approaches of NDC.

The intention of this activity was to involve NDC's board members and staff in a genuine, in depth, strategic analysis and discussion about the current state of NDC while collectively re-examining and developing its vision, values, mandates, and strategies. Further, it sought to ensure future activities are appropriately and adequately responsive to the needs of the beneficiaries, NGOs and the community at large, taking into consideration prevailing political and socio-economic conditions.

## 2. Approach and Methodology

The planning process hinged upon active participation of NDC's board and staff, who ultimately formulated the resulting plan (initially by the staff, then by incorporating solicited input from the Board). After assessing the expectations and perceptions of the participants, a planning workshop was conducted which resulted in the formulation of a strategic plan by NDC's staff in West Bank only<sup>1</sup>. The prevailing siege imposed on Gaza prevented Gaza's staff from participating. The workshop was designed to encourage participants to work their way through each step of the plan.

An interactive participatory approach was pursued throughout the planning process, which was continuously adapted to participants' needs while drawing on individual's experience and skill. Immediacy and relevance were of priority throughout the process. A Problem solving approach rather than the classical banking approach was used. To this end, participatory 'snow-ball technique' was used as a basic tool in assisting participants' collective development of strategic framework for NDC. The basic principles of this technique are the following:

- Ownership of the strategic planning process shall belong to participants.
  - Participatory planning and decision-making begin by creating a mood for learning rather than plunging directly into problem solving. Thereafter, the learning phase sets the stage for strategic and tactical planning. The strategic-planning stage, in turn, generates broad directions and priorities which are later molded into detailed implementation actions during tactical (project) planning.
  - The use of this technique during strategic planning serves to facilitate the formulation of group consensus in prioritizing objectives and in identifying possibilities for future action.
- Such an approach to planning has enabled respective participants to undertake joint-planning, consultative/transparent decision-making and steering/control of the process. The essential elements of the process -
- teamwork, visualization and facilitation - served to improve communication and cooperation among participants.
- Basically, the approach has focused on the following issues:
- Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the existing context, policies, services and support systems of NDC. Thereby, the participants would conduct the analysis and diagnosis collaboratively.
  - Deciding and articulating what is needed. Consequently the participants would collaboratively set their realistic vision.
  - Deciding in pragmatic terms, directions, priorities, and institutional responsibilities. Accordingly, the participants would collaboratively create a strategy.
  - Developing and/or overseeing development of project policies, specifications, timeline, technologies, etc... needed to move from the present to the future. Therefore the participants would collaboratively formulate project tactics.

<sup>1</sup> Brief Workshop Outline is found in Appendix I

Further, the snow-ball technique enabled participants to collectively “walk through” the different stages of strategic planning, accumulating knowledge as they proceeded, building and enlarging this knowledge base (similar in process to that of a rolling ‘snow ball’) until a consensus concerning the strategic directions for NDC has been reached.

Resulting from this planning process, a strategic planning framework for NDC was drafted to govern both short and medium term developmental interventions. This framework was further discussed and fine-tuned by the Board of Directors and the staff in subsequent workshops and meetings. The document below summarizes the main features of this framework.

Starting with a review of the major historical milestones that influenced the shaping of today’s NDC - coupled with an analysis of the existing internal and external environment - and revisiting NDC’s set of values, the document presents NDC’s vision and mission statement. Major internal and external obstacles and constraints that could hinder the realization of this vision are presented. A set of strategic directions is described. Through these directions, NDC will be able to deal with these obstacles and constraints by diffusing them and/or lessening their effects. Subsequently, the document describes the major strategic elements and concludes with the suggested action plan.

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### 3. Historical Context

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NDC’s characteristics have been shaped by a combination of internal and external forces. Additionally, they are directly linked to the evolution of Palestine’s modern civil society, especially within the NGO sector. Surely, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the subsequent socio-economic and political situation in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) have had the greatest influence on NDC’s historical development.

The history of civil society organizations can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the emergence of charitable societies, religious and cultural organizations, and youth clubs. Traditionally based on religious and familial affiliations, these were often led by prominent families. The NGOs, in contrast, are a more recent phenomenon and started in the form of weakly structured youth groups and committees. They have since evolved into professional and specialized organizations which are commonly affiliated with political factions.

Many of the existing NGOs have their roots in the voluntary-work committees of the early nineteen-seventies. They were originally organized to cultivate lands, harvest crops, or pave new roads in hopes of strengthening the steadfastness of the people and in protecting land against confiscation. With the establishment of the Higher Council for Voluntary Work Committees in 1976, their work became more coordinated and their presence more visible. Competition among the various political factions, however, led to a situation where each created its ‘own brand’ of committees.

By the early eighties, various voluntary committees had already developed into well-established grassroots (popular) organizations. Each specialized in different sectors (such as health, agriculture, education, etc...) and served specific segments of society (such as women, youth, workers, farmers, and high school students). Although politically motivated, this led to significant improvements in the developmental process. Health outreach services were established. Campaigns against illiteracy were organized. Income generating projects for women were encouraged. Preschools were established. Agricultural extension

services were also initiated. New crops and cropping patterns, as well as new irrigation techniques, were among many introduced advances. By providing services and assistance to their constituencies, the various organizations hoped to increase the popular base and support for their respective political groups. Nonetheless, and irrespective of their individual political agendas, they all promoted a similar agenda: steadfastness on the land (sumud) and resisting the occupation (tasaddi).

The availability of Arab funding after the signing of the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt, in 1978, and the concentration of the PLO's efforts on the West Bank and Gaza after the loss of its bases in Lebanon of civil society organizations - both in number and coverage. In addition to direct financing by the PLO, a joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee<sup>2</sup> was established at the time to organize and channel Arab funding to Palestinian institutions. Subsequently, many development projects were implemented, including: paving and constructing new roads, building or maintaining hospitals and clinics, and implementing housing projects, among others. Old charitable societies were revived and new ones established. Production and housing cooperatives as well as Human rights organizations and research centers were also founded.

The eruption of the first *Intifada* (December 1987) marks a significant turning point in the development of the various institutions. By the end of 1987, almost all segments of the Palestinian society were organized within the different grassroots organizations. In an effort to boycott the occupying authorities and to disengage from Israeli control, the various organizations, together with the popular committees that were established at the time, tried to create alternative service delivery systems and institutions that would substitute those affiliated with the occupying power.

Concurrently, a host of other civil society organizations became part of Palestinian life, such as: popular organizations (women's groups, labor unions, neighborhood committees); development organizations (agriculture and health committees); research, media and human rights organizations; and special interest groups (such as those for the disabled or the elderly). The steadfastness (sumud) and resistance (tasaddi) strategies were augmented by a new set of strategies, namely, those related to construction and development (al-Binaa). At the time, the different organizations had to develop adequate managerial and administrative competence in order to cope with the new tasks.

In the following years, these organizations grew even stronger and more professional. They reached a point where they could collectively formulate the first comprehensive plan for the development of the oPt. This was presented in the Nengoot Conference on Euro-Palestinian Development and Cooperation, in Brussels in 1991. That was followed, in 1993, by the establishment of the first Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), in aftermath of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel. Its objective was enhancing coordination, consultation and cooperation among the different sectors of civil society.

The Gulf War, in early 1991, and later the Madrid Conference, in October of 1991, instigated new changes in the character and mode of operation of the various Palestinian organizations - and on the relatively nascent NGOs in particular. Arab countries ceased their transfers to the PLO because of the latter's position on the war. Consequently, the PLO's support to the various organizations was drastically reduced.

On the other hand, after the Madrid Conference more international donors became interested in supporting Palestinians in the oPt. This provided the already established organizations with a new source of funding. However, it coerced the grassroots organizations to undergo vast institutional and organizational changes

<sup>2</sup> The Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee was dismantled after the Palestinian-Jordanian disengagement in 1988, according to which the whole responsibility for the West Bank and Gaza Strip was transferred to PLO.

in order to become eligible for various donors' funding, while simultaneously coping with their requirements.

In due course, the majority of grassroots organizations developed into professional NGOs. Owing to their effectiveness as service delivery agents, they started to focus on delivering services using donor funds and became less concerned about their responsibility to articulate national concerns, such as opposing occupation. Gradually, this has made NGOs more and more aid dependent and "donor controlled", rendering them less and less flexible in pursuing their "own" priorities.

At once, pressure for professionalization compelled NGOs to produce project results without much emphasis on strengthening their link to the grassroots population. The political activists of the Intifada became the professional managers and administrators of the emerging NGOs. This transformation from grassroots organizations to NGOs brought about shrinkage in their popular base and a relative reduction in the geographic coverage of their services.

With the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994, new political realities were established which in turn redefined the conceptual framework of the Palestinian development strategies, including those of the NGOs. This new framework organically inter-linked three mutually dependent sets of strategies. On one hand, major parts of the Palestinian territories continued to be under occupation and, thus, required the continuation of steadfastness and resistance driven strategies. On the other hand, development and reconstruction strategies were called upon to prepare the grounds for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. A third set of strategies emerged which focused on defining the new socio-economic and cultural content of the future Palestinian society. Issues like equality, democracy, human rights, policy formulation, and rule-of-law became part of the NGOs' agenda.

The relationship between the NGO sector and the PNA, however, was not especially smooth. The early days of the PNA marked a relationship of competition and uncertainty. The newly created PNA was perceived as a competitor in the delivering of basic services, a domain which was serviced by NGOs for some time. At once, both seemed to be competing for the same resource base, human and financial. Many NGO activists and workers were recruited by the PNA to fill in vacant positions in the newly created administration. Although more funds were available to assist the Palestinian people in the OPT, most of them were allocated to establishing and strengthening the newly established PNA institutions, leaving little to the NGOs who began losing funding from international donors.

Within this context, and due to the inability of the PNA to take on most social service deliveries, the first Palestinian NGO Project (PNGO I) was launched by the World Bank in 1997 to assist the NGOs in complementing PNA's services. Through international bidding, a project management organization (PMO), the Welfare Association Consortium, was selected. In addition to utilizing the NGOs for delivering services to the poor and the marginalized – thus enhancing the NGOs' institutional capacities - the project aimed at strengthening the working relationship between the PNA and the NGO sector. As dialogue between the two was initiated, mutual acceptance and complementarities between them grew.

Gradually, the nature of programs pursued by NGOs was changing to focus more on the role of civil society, democracy, rule-of-law, gender, and human rights; in addition to service delivery. Coordination, collaboration, and partnership mechanisms between PNA and the NGOs were also established. By 2000, they even succeeded to draft jointly the Law of Charitable Associations and Community Organizations (or simply the NGO Law), which provided an improved legal framework regulating the NGO sector in the OPT.

With the eruption of the Second Intifada (al-Aqsa Intifada) in September 2000, the situation started to change drastically. The subsequent siege, closures, incursions, movement restrictions, construction of the Separation Wall (deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice) and cantonization of the Palestinian

communities, all posed new challenges and threats for Palestinians in the oPt. Soon, freedom of movement for Palestinians within West Bank, including access to its very heart, East Jerusalem, as well as access between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip became the exception rather than the norm.

The Palestinian economy stagnated. Palestinians could not access their lands, reach water resources, travel to work, go to school or university, achieve reasonable access to basic health services, sell their goods in the market, or export their products. Overnight, thousands of jobs and thousands of household incomes dried up. Poverty and unemployment rates rose to unprecedented levels. Responding to the arising immediate needs, the NGOs (as well as the PNA) had to shift to emergency mode: distributing food, providing basic health and social services, and implementing new projects that create jobs. Against this background, and due to the important role played by NGOs in providing basic services, PNGO II was started in 2001.

Building upon lessons learned from PNGO I, PNGO II was designed with the aim of empowering the NGOs to play a more strategic role as both service providers and development partners with the PNA in policy making. While maintaining the longer-term objectives of the Project, it also provided a window for supporting emergency programs and projects catering to the community's urgent needs and services.

In 2003, the oPt started to witness a relative social and economic recovery. Serious initiatives to reform the PNA were started. The NGO sector was actively involved in the process. The Medium Term Development Plans (MTDP) of 20057- and 20068-, signaled the success of such collaboration – both of which were developed with the active participation of NGO representatives. Furthermore, the successes of PNGO I and PNGO II led the PNA, in 2005, to request that the World Bank support a third Palestinian NGO project. To inform the formulation of the new project, the PMO (of PNGO II) supported in 2006 a wide consultative process among the main stakeholders in Palestinian society (including representatives from civil society, government, the private sector, donor agencies, and international NGOs). This process led to the formulation of the Strategy for the Development of the Palestinian NGO Sector. The Strategy proposed a set of strategic directives for the NGO sector, and also identified the resources and institutional arrangements that would be needed to implement them.

However, the short-term recovery of 2003 was drastically reversed as a result of the political and financial siege imposed on the PNA upon the formation of the Hamas-led government, in March 2006. This was compounded by the intensification of Israeli occupation measures. Among these measures the Israeli occupation began withholding tax and customs revenues they collected on behalf of the PNA (according to the Oslo Agreement). Simultaneously, the international community suspended nearly all aid to the PNA. Coupled with reduced local revenues, this led to immense suffering and insecurity.

Chiefly, the financial siege led to disempowering the PNA by cutting off their funding, disrupting the progress of institution building, reversing a decade of reforms, and considerably reducing their capacity to deliver basic services. To cope with the deteriorating situation, households resorted to borrowing, selling possessions, reducing healthcare and food consumption, and taking children out of school.<sup>3</sup> Due to their limited resources, NGOs and other civil society organizations could not adequately compensate the disintegrating services provided by the public sector.

The worsening socio-economic situation, together with the imposed political and financial siege, deepened factional polarization and violence within Palestinian society. This resulted in the geographical and political severing of the oPt, as Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. A new "care-taking" government was then formed in the West Bank.

<sup>3</sup> Oxfam Survey of Household Heads and Other Adults in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, 1219- March 2007.



The situation in the West Bank has improved, relatively. Yet the overall picture is still grim. By December 2008, over half of the Palestinians lived in poverty: 45.7% in the West Bank and 79.4% in Gaza.<sup>4</sup> The Palestinian economy continued to shrink and real GDP per capita continued to decline: in 2008, real GDP growth was around 2% while the population growth was higher. In due course, the PNA has become increasingly aid dependent.

At the same time, political rivalry and polarization intensified. In the West Bank, NGOs and institutions allegedly sympathizing with Hamas have been closed by the PNA. Correspondingly, those institutions supporting the PNA in Gaza were prohibited by the Hamas led government. Surprisingly, the NGO sector's reaction to all of this was faint. Since 2000, they were already overwhelmed in dealing with the emergency needs and priorities of the population. They, among others, contributed little to curb the growing internal political tension. Responding to the ever-increasing humanitarian crises, rather than political engagement and advocacy, became the priority. Their influence on promoting internal dialogue and reconciliation within the society was negligible. Moreover, and due to different political views held by the NGOs and within the major NGOs networks, they were unable to come up with a unified position and approach to deal with the continuing internal political conflict.

On the political level, continuously, efforts have been initiated to bring rival parties into dialogue with the hope of reuniting the oPt and of starting a reconstruction and recovery plan, in both the West Bank and Gaza. The results of such efforts are still to be seen. Certainly, if the internal political fighting is not brought to an end, the socio-economic fabric may not be able to cope with the continuously deteriorating situation.

Amidst all of this, PNGO III was initiated in 2007. It aimed to consolidate and sustain NGO's capacities, which had been built-up during the first two PNGO projects, by putting the driving force for further NGO development into the hands of Palestinian NGOs. It was envisioned that the Project Management Organization (PMO), the implementing unit of the previous projects, would be transformed into the NGO Development Center (NDC)- which was registered in March 2006 as an independent Palestinian NGO dedicated to grant-making and NGO sector development. NDC began its operations on November 1, 2006 taking over the management of PNGO II and eventually PNGO III. The assets, systems and staff of the Consortium's PMO were transferred to NDC.

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## 4. Situation Analysis

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Despite the prevailing conditions, NDC has, in a short period of time, established itself as a professional, credible and reliable institution- leveraging funds from donors and providing qualitative services to the NGOs and the sector as a whole - building on eight years of valuable experience and knowledge in PNGO I & II. Its programs encompass providing financial and technical assistance to the NGOs, encouraging partnerships, coalition-building, networking, and supporting research and policy formulations for the NGO sector as a whole. Its recent achievement in facilitating the drafting of the Palestinian NGO Code of Conduct in 2008 is the first of its kind in Palestine and the Arab world. The Code was drafted in cooperation with the NGO's umbrella networks and unions who implemented a series of discussions with more than 200 NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It aims at enhancing accountability, transparency and good governance standards in the NGO sector.

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<sup>3</sup> [www.palestinemonitor.org](http://www.palestinemonitor.org)

Since its establishment, NDC has increased its scope of work and project intervention to manage four main programs: the Palestinian NGO Project III, the Job Creation Project, the Human Rights and Good Governance Program, and Masader - the NGO Portal - for an amount exceeding 23 million USD. These programs combine urgently needed funding with sector development initiatives that help NGOs achieve greater day-to-day impact and strengthen the NGO sector as a whole. NDC works on three tracks: grant-making, sector development and capacity building. Thereby, NDC aims to improve the effectiveness, self-reliance and sustainability of NGOs.

Following is a short analysis of the internal and external environment, highlighting major factors that may influence the work of NDC in coming years.

## 4.1. The Internal Environment: Strengths and Weaknesses

### 4.1.1. Strengths

**NDC possesses abundant human and physical assets and diverse experience:** NDC has been operational for just three years. Nonetheless, it possesses abundant human and physical assets and builds upon more than eight years of diverse accumulated experience and credibility specializing in supporting the NGOs and the NGO sector through PNGO I & II. Linkage to Welfare Association, which contributes towards management costs and allocates an endowment to cover the Center's running costs, is another asset that provides NDC with significant leverage, visibility, and credibility. Additionally, the Welfare Association utilizes the services of NDC to channel donated funds received for grant-making to NGOs.

Moreover, NDC has been able to establish a wide range of local and international partners. In 2008, for example, NDC worked with around 180 local partners to help dozens of communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Further, its General Assembly and Board of Directors include representatives from major NGOs networks and unions, as well as, NGO experts and activists. At the same time, NDC is increasingly widening its pool of donor partners to include, in addition to already existing donors and partners<sup>5</sup>, new sources of funding in support of NDC's work.

**NDC is dynamic and responsive to arising needs:** NDC's programs enable NGOs to be more responsive and adaptive to arising needs through combining development and emergency/relief interventions. The programs are active in helping them perform with improved quality and better directed outcomes, reaching out to marginalized community-based organizations. Through that, these programs increase the availability of services to the poorest and most marginalized Palestinians. This is clearly exemplified in NDC's ability to work in, and cope with the difficulties pertaining to the prevailing situation in Gaza Strip.

**NDC is a unique national Palestinian organization:** NDC is the first professional organization of its kind, created and led by Palestinians, focusing on strengthening NGOs, facilitating the development of an active and vibrant NGO sector in Palestine and encouraging wider partnerships and cooperation among and between the different development actors. NDC possesses an open work culture with no political or religious affiliations, advocating tolerance and reconciliation within the Palestinian society.

<sup>5</sup> Already, NDC has a wide range of donor partners, such as the World Bank, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, French Development Agency (AFD), Germany, and the European Commission Technical Assistance office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (EC) and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (through Welfare Association).

**NDC's approach is comprehensive and caters to the needs of NGOs through a wide range of programs:** NDC provides grants and diverse technical assistance and training to enhance the capacities of individual NGOs and their umbrella organizations. Consecutively it aims at developing and strengthening the abilities, processes and resources of NGOs in order to improve their performance, quality of services and service delivery provided to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In particular, it provides skills and tools needed to strengthen their effectiveness, financial self-reliance, and sustainability. On the other hand, it works on developing and organizing the sector as a whole through supporting coordination, networking and coalition building among the NGOs, as well as, through carrying out research, introducing professional work standards, and establishing platforms promoting dialogue and knowledge sharing. Simultaneously, NDC encourages building partnerships and cooperation between the NGOs and other development partners, especially with the public sector and local authority institutions.

**NDC has committed and qualified staff:** NDC has been successful in recruiting a team of well qualified, experienced, and dedicated staff who are highly committed to NDC's values and principles and sensitive to community needs and concerns.

**NDC has clear and well developed governance and management structures:** NDC is governed by a Board of Directors composed of highly esteemed civil society experts. In addition to representatives from the Welfare Association, the Board includes representatives from: Palestinian NGOs, unions and networks, the private sector, NGO experts, and academia. It is the first time that heads of large Palestinian NGOs networks sit together on a board to discuss and formulate policies and direction.

On the operational level, NDC has been capable, in a short period of time, to institute a clear organizational structure with well defined roles and job descriptions. Lines of authority are appropriately identified, streamlining efficient delegation of responsibilities and timely provision of feedback and support. It has well established internal management and accounting systems that meet international standards. Additionally, NDC's internal regulations and procedures are well-developed and documented. These procedures include: clear and transparent project appraisal and selection procedures, streamlined financial management and disbursement arrangements, and monitoring and evaluation processes.

**NDC has established good foundations for securing funding from diverse sources:** Over a short period of time, NDC has established itself as a professional, accountable, and reliable agency that is trusted by donors for effective channeling of funds and assistance to Palestinian NGOs. Through this, NDC enhances their capacities to provide improved services to their constituencies, particularly the marginalized and the poor. NDC's annual cash flow has risen from around 2.5 million dollars, in 2007, to more than 10 million dollars, in 2008. In the first half of 2009, NDC was able to solicit new grants amounting to 4.85 millions. As mentioned earlier, the pool of donor partners is expanding to include - in addition to the World Bank and the Welfare Association - new donors such as: the European Commission (EC), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (through Welfare Association), the Netherlands, Germany, AFD, and others. The already developed Communication Strategy is considered "central to the fundraising efforts of NDC on both the regional and international levels".

**NDC is a learning institution:** NDC is a growing and learning organization that is continuously developing its own "NDC procedures". It is keen on constantly developing accountable and

transparent processes and procedures according to local needs while accommodating various donors' requirements. Importantly, NDC should ensure that such changes do not overburden or confuse the staff and partner institutions alike.

#### 4.1.2. Weaknesses

**NDC's visibility does not adequately reflect its work or its achievements:** There is a need for NDC to exert more efforts in presenting itself more sufficiently, especially by fully informing stakeholders of its activities and successes.

**Relations with the public and private sectors' institutions** need further enhancement and strengthening.

**NDC's Management Information System (MIS) needs to fully expand to become more comprehensive:** This action is currently underway. The MIS system was established as a component of the World Bank's projects. Some other programs (e.g., AFD supported Emergency Job Creation program) are already integrated. Expanding the MIS and integrating other programs (like HR/GG) is now under way. A new position, namely, "M&E Specialist" has been created to lead and oversee the further development of the system in order to rationalize and efficiently utilize data and information for improved management within NDC.

**High dependency on external funding** threatens the future sustainability of NDC. NDC needs to look for alternative and diversified financing sources locally, regionally, and internationally.

**Staff turn-over is relatively high:** Despite the fact that NDC has been able to attract a good mix of qualified and experienced staff, it has been unable to maintain long-term employment. Reasons for such high turn-over could be attributed to: movement restrictions imposed by the Israelis, which create additional difficulties and burdens on the staff; uncompetitive salaries, vis-à-vis the private sector and the international development agencies; and unsatisfactory performance of the staff.

### 4.2. The External Environment: Opportunities and Threats

#### 4.2.1. Opportunities

**Continued Palestinian demand for reliable and sustainable NGO service delivery:** Due to the prevailing political and socio-economic conditions, there is high demand for basic services, which the government alone is unable to meet. There is an ongoing need for NGO service delivery to complement that of the public sector. NDC is well-equipped to continue its support to the NGO sector through: its established grant-making mechanisms, provision of technical and managerial capacity building to individual NGOs, and facilitation of NGO sector development as a whole.

**Continued interest among the various donors to support the Palestinian NGO sector through an established and sustainable mechanism:** The successes of NDC, its track record, and professionalism, combined with PNGO I & II legacy, render it credible and trustworthy for further channeling of funds to Palestinian NGOs.

**The availability of stable funding would lead to more sustainable NGO's service delivery:** Donors are increasingly interested in supporting good governance initiatives and programs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; an issue high within NDC's priorities. Similarly, regional and international interest in Jerusalem is growing. NDC's experience with Jerusalem NGOs makes it a natural local partner to potential donors wanting to support initiatives and channel funds to local NGOs in Jerusalem. Eventually, improvement in the financial situation of NDC would render it more sustainable and more competitive in attracting and maintaining qualified staff.

**Diversification of funding would enhance NDC's independence and image:** In turn, NDC would reinforce its identity as a Palestinian institution working for the benefit of Palestinian NGOs, and the Palestinian population at large, rather than being a project or tool of any donor.

**The national planning processes offers greater programmatic details for Palestinian development priorities:** Both, the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP 2008-2010) and its successor the Palestinian National Plan 2011 - 2013 (the development of which has been initiated) outline the PNA's medium term priorities and budgetary frameworks in the areas of Governance, Economy, Social Services, and Infrastructure. This would certainly help NGOs, including NDC, to streamline their plans and programs in harmony with declared national priorities while supporting and complementing those of the Government. Additionally, the national planning processes themselves would open new doors for more NGO engagement in identifying and formulating general and sectoral intervention priorities. It would also provide good potential opportunity for NDC to facilitate (and participate in) policy dialogue and partnerships between NGOs and various public institutions, within both planning and implementation levels. In this context, it is imperative for NDC to seek improving its relations with PNA institutions, especially with Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (MOPAD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI).

**Stabilization of the political situation would improve the overall economic situation** and would encourage more donors to support development interventions (rather than focusing on emergency and relief). More funding would be available to the NGOs and to NDC, in particular.

**NDC could play a leading role in advocating for and instituting social responsibility of private sector institutions:** Some large companies already allocate certain funds to support initiatives and events carried out by NGOs. However, this is done on ad-hoc basis and in a scattered manner. NDC is best situated to promote social responsibility concepts and mechanisms, e.g., through proposing laws/regulations, establishing social responsibility fund, etc.

**The established "Masader" portal would be increasingly and effectively utilized,** as more NGOs tend to use IT and new technologies in their daily work.

## 4.2.2. Threats

**NDC operates in a fluid environment, especially the political aspect, over which it has no control:** The occupation and the measures imposed by Israel on the Palestinians pose the greatest challenges for NDC. Closures, movement restrictions, construction of the Separation Wall, land confiscations, and house demolitions, all continue to disrupt socio-economic development and divert attention toward emergency and relief interventions. Political uncertainty, internal political polarization and rivalry, complicate the situation. The challenge for NDC is to have a bifocal approach amidst all of this by linking emergency and relief activities to development and continuing its support to strengthening NGOs and the NGO sector as a whole. Thereby, NDC focuses on channeling relief funds to the marginalized and needy as these funds enhance service delivery capacities and the institutional development of NGOs.

**The deteriorating situation in Gaza Strip creates immense challenges for NDC and the NGOs:** The ongoing blockade, coupled with Hamas' seizure of power has pervasive effects on various institutions, the economy, and the society as a whole. In the absence of open crossings, secure borders and Palestinian unity, the population in Gaza will continue to be isolated. The rise in internal tensions, the collapse of a formal economy, and the critical shortages of basic supplies, all add immense difficulties to the already deteriorated socio-economic and humanitarian situation. Israel's invasion of Gaza Strip in late December, 2008, aggravated the situation. Gaza slid further still into a deep humanitarian crisis. Homes and businesses were leveled and thousands were left homeless. Public infrastructure and utilities were destroyed leaving the majority of Gazans unable to attain basic needs. Poverty levels rocketed to unprecedented and alarming levels. The majority of Gazans are now unable to afford basic food. It is estimated that over 80% of families in Gaza currently rely upon humanitarian aid to survive. Once again, NGOs (and international agencies) have been altered by the crisis which has forced them to modify their programs to focus on emergency and humanitarian aid efforts in order to meet the population's needs.

**The blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip generates operational difficulties for the NDC and NGOs:** Flow of humanitarian and basic supplies into the Strip are restricted by Israel. Thus increasing the reliance on goods distributed by international aid agencies or smuggled through underground tunnels along the border with Egypt - which is irregular and lacking control over quality or timing of delivery. Construction materials, large size goods, spare parts for water and sanitation projects, industrial, and agricultural materials are unavailable. Fuel shortages and intermittent electricity make it extremely difficult to carry out required duties in time. Movement of experts and staff in and out of Gaza is almost impossible. All of this hampers projects' implementation and exerts more pressures on NDC and its partner NGOs to operate and cope with the arising needs of the population on one hand, and to meet deadlines and donor requirements on the other hand.

**Israeli measures continue to inhibit significant socio-economic improvement in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem):** Despite the relative improvement in the economy<sup>6</sup>, imposed Israeli measures continue to deepen the cantonization and spatial fragmentation of the Palestinian

6 The Palestinian Bureau of Statistics estimated GDP growth at 5.6 percent in the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. This growth comes after per capita GDP dropped by a third between 1999 and 2008 and economic growth reached only 2 percent in 2008.

communities. Such measures include: the network of closures<sup>7</sup>; movement restrictions; the continued construction of the illegal Separation Wall; land confiscation; housing demolition; eviction of Palestinian families, continued settlement expansion and construction of new settlements; obstructed access to land, business, employment, and basic social services. This results in constrained livelihoods and the restriction of any real development in the OPT.

Furthermore, there are continued limitations on Palestinian access to large farming and grazing areas, located in Area C and within the vicinity of Israeli settlements. Likewise, sustained access to quality education services is very difficult for children residing in area C. The situation is compounded by the inability of the PNA to meet its recurrent budget leading to a reduction in the much needed services, especially to the marginalized and poorer segments of the population. Anticipating that most funding would be directed to provide much needed humanitarian aid, repairing the damage, and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip, the Civil Society Organizations in the West Bank are unable to step-in and compensate the shortages in basic services provided by the public sector. This is especially true when taking into consideration their limited resources and fragmentation.

**Overarching Israeli governmental plans and policies in East Jerusalem pose a particular challenge to NDC and NGOs:** These plans and policies include, but are not limited to: land expropriation; the recent developments in the Jerusalem, the Old city and its vicinity with the on-going construction of settlements; settlement roads and infrastructure; restrictions on building; demolitions; evictions; confiscation of Palestinian homes and public infrastructure couple with a housing shortage and subsequent overcrowding; poor water and sanitation services; prejudicial land and zoning laws/regulations; severe closures and restriction of movement of people, goods and services to and from East Jerusalem, resulting in a continuously declining economy; ID card confiscations altering residency rights and permits – thereby reducing access to employment, education, health, and other services; restricting and closing Palestinian institutions and NGOs<sup>8</sup>. Particularly, the construction of the Separation Wall around Jerusalem has devastating consequences. It has already curtailed access to East Jerusalem – the major Palestinian health, economic, religious and education center.

The abovementioned actions have consistently worked to: deteriorate the socio-economic situation; infringe the political, civil and human rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites; and to decline the Palestinian character of East Jerusalem by creating an increasingly poor, marginalized and disenfranchised community. The Palestinian Jerusalemites are becoming more and more reliant on Israel's discriminatory system of services based on ethno-national affiliation.

Youth, in particular, are experiencing profound hardships such as the lack of constructive outlets like recreational facilities, and issues of unemployment, drug addiction, and loss of identity amidst alienation from the rest of OPT. The declining quality of education and educational facilities has contributed to further deterioration in human capital, productivity and capacity of the Palestinian workforce; thus raising vital questions regarding the future of the Palestinian youth in East Jerusalem.<sup>9</sup>

7 Closure network includes various movement obstacles, such as, checkpoints, roadblocks, earth mounds, earth walls, road gates, trenches, restricted areas, and 'settler-only' roads. The number of movement barriers rose from 425 in January 2006 to around 620 in the first half of 2009, out of which 69 are permanently staffed checkpoints. Thirty-eight (38) of the 69 permanently staffed checkpoints are used by the Israeli authorities to prevent access of Palestinians without permits into East Jerusalem and Israel. In addition to that, there are 84 obstacles blocking Palestinian access and movement within the Israeli controlled area of Hebron City (H2), 63 crossing points along the Separation Wall, which control Palestinian movement into West Bank areas on the west side of the Wall, and a weekly average of 70 random ("flying") checkpoints deployed randomly in the West Bank. [www.ochaopt.org](http://www.ochaopt.org)

8 It is estimated that around 30 Palestinian institutions and NGOs have been closed by the Israeli authorities since the outbreak of Al-Aksa Intifada in September of 2000.

9 Over 49% of East Jerusalem residents are children.

The unresolved internal tension between rival factions continues to threaten the political, social, and institutional fabric of the Palestinian society: Despite the several rounds of dialogue between the various political factions and groups, conflict issues are not resolved. The situation is fragile and without reaching an agreement it could lead to further political polarization and an escalation of internal violence. This, in turn would lead to further fragmentation and deterioration of the Palestinian social fabric. Already, the rivalry between the two has cast its shadows on the NGO sector as many NGOs are targets by/for both factions.

The weak and fragmented NGO sector requires special attention from NDC: The NGO sector has a mixed image among Palestinians. Traditionally, NGOs have played a crucial role in formulating Palestinian development priorities and in providing much needed services to the population; especially in times of crises. Recently, however, and despite the improved professionalism and institutional development that has been witnessed within individual NGOs, their role and impact in the public domain have declined. Their engagement in implementing individual programs and emergency projects is still highly commended, yet, as traditional NGO activists/leaders have moved over time to political spheres, the involvement of the sector in policy dialogue and in influencing national priorities and concerns has become scattered and relatively modest. In addition, movement of staff from Palestinian NGOs to international development agencies (who can offer higher salaries) leads to the depletion of qualified human resources. This, in turn leads to further weakening the Palestinian NGO sector. Lack of a common vision, fragmentation, political competition, and leadership-crisis characterize the existing NGO sector - raising much concerns over its impact.

The global economic crisis and the devaluation in the US dollar reduce resources available to Palestinian NGOs: A continual stagnation in the international economy could mean less funding will be available to support the Palestinian community. In such a global economic condition, if funding is made available, the bulk of it would likely be consumed to cover the operational budget of the PNA alongside financing humanitarian aid and relief interventions. Further, the recent devaluation of the dollar reduces the level of planned outputs for projects while it increase the operational cost of NGOs and NDC, alike. This is true as most planning and granting is based on the US dollar.

**Potential conflict-of-interest within the Board of Directors:** The Board of Directors includes representatives of NGOs or NGO networks and unions, who themselves are potential beneficiaries of NDC. This could potentially create conflicts-of-interest, which in turn, could weaken the Board's decision making abilities and its ultimate effectiveness.

### 4.3. Main Strategic Issues

Taking into consideration the external and internal context, as well as the community and the NGOs needs the following strategic issues need to be addressed by NDC in the following five years:



#### 4.3.1. Internal Strategic Issues

Internally, NDC shall focus on three interrelated issues:

- a) The sustainability of NDC, especially ensuring secured financing for its operations and programs.
- b) Enhancing the institutional capacity of NDC which includes: development of human resources, improving internal organization and procedures, strengthening its governance structure, and reinforcing its relations with its partners (i.e. NGOs, public sector institutions, the private sector, and the donor community.)
- c) Enhancing the leading and distinctive role and performance of NDC.

#### 4.3.2. External Strategic Issues

Externally, NDC shall concentrate its efforts in the coming period on tackling the following main issues:

- a) NGOs' service delivery and accessibility to services, especially those:
  - a.Related to combating poverty and unemployment, particularly in Gaza Strip.
  - b.Providing such services to marginalized and impoverished groups and areas.
  - c.Supporting Palestinian Jerusalemites and their institutions - especially in youth organizations and in protecting human rights.
- b) Developing and strengthening the NGOs sector.
- c) Strengthening relations with development partners –NGOs, public institutions, private sector, and the donor community.

## 5. Values, Vision, and Mission of NDC

### 5.1. Value system of NDC

The nature and the ultimate purpose of NDC, its structure, the way its run, and the scope and content of its programs stem from a set of values and principles anchored in its tradition and culture; and in the collective beliefs and aspirations of its Board members and staff. These include: principles of democracy, respect for and protection of human dignity and rights, appreciation of diversity, loyalty to national aspirations, commitment to Palestinian development priorities, objectivity and impartiality in serving the community, distinction and excellence in work, good governance, integrity, transparency, accountability, volunteerism, participation, cooperation, and partnership building.

### 5.2 Vision of NDC

Based on years of accumulated experiences, and on its understanding and assessment of the prevailing internal and external conditions, and in conformity with its set of values and beliefs, NDC aspires to realize the following vision:

“An Effective NGO sector contributing to building Palestinian civil society”.

### 5.3. Mission of NDC

In line with its values and its vision, NDC’s mission statement can be summed up as follows:

The NGO Development Center (NDC) is a non-profit nongovernmental organization established in response to the need of having a sustainable Palestinian mechanism for providing support to the NGOs sector. Through providing technical and financial support, NDC works on developing the capacities of Palestinian NGOs in providing quality services, especially to the poor and the marginalized, on enhancing their self-reliance, and on empowering them to be more sustainable. At the same time, NDC contributes towards the development of the NGOs sector as a whole by facilitating sharing and exchange of information and experience, by supporting research and policy development, and by strengthening NGOs relationships with development partners.

## 6. Objectives and Strategy

### 6.1. Overall Objectives of the Plan

On the path of fulfilling its mission, NDC shall work on achieving the following objectives:

1. NDC is a main address for supporting and developing the NGO sector and its institutions.
2. NDC is more competent and responsive to the various needs of the community
3. NDC possesses the means and capabilities that would enhance its financial and administrative capacities.
4. Empowering NGOs to provide quality services that are responsive to the Palestinian society's priorities.
5. NGO sector is more efficient and capable to influence the formulation of national policies and plans.

### 6.2. Strategy

Considering its strengths, weaknesses, and the context in which it works NDC foresees favorable conditions conducive to its **growth which entail an overall strategy of increasing and widening NDC's scope of services, and enhancing its institutional capabilities**. This is especially dependent on the availability of funds and on NDC's ability to manage and implement these funds. It is also dependent on increased demand for NDC's services among the NGO community. The assumption is that, if no drastic changes in the context occurs, external funding to Palestinians in the near future will continue in magnitudes comparable to the existing levels.

Should the internal political situation improve, more funding would be available. Similarly, but less likely, any breakthrough in the political process between the PLO and Israel would lead to a significant increase in available funds. Recent experiences show signs of growing interest among donors to support NDC. To utilize and sustain this interest, however, continued communication and aggressive fundraising campaigns should be pursued. In parallel, NDC needs to explore new and alternative financing opportunities in order to ensure its financial sustainability and to reduce its vulnerability, should donor priorities change.

Internally, NDC needs to enhance its capability to deliver. Firstly, this requires enhancing the capacities and capabilities of the staff and reducing turnover. Secondly, its internal administrative and managerial policies and procedures should be streamlined further and consolidated. Regarding demand, the recent trend indicates an ever increasing need for NDC's various services among the NGOs and the community

at large. In order to be able to meet the different needs of the NGOs, NDC will expand its existing programs and to diversify them, making room for broader coverage of needs. Within the context of the existing situation, ample funding would be available for relief and humanitarian aid. The challenge facing NDC in this respect is to be responsive and adaptive to the arising needs of the community while maintaining the strategic competence to accomplish its declared objectives.

To achieve the aforementioned objectives and to realize the anticipated growth, NDC will pursue the following four-tiered strategy in the coming five years:

### Internally directed strategic actions:

1. Institutional and competence building of NDC: This includes such interventions as strengthening and activating the Board of Directors, improving internal regulations and procedures, developing and implementing a plan for the development and training of the staff, and improving the salary and incentive package.
2. Broadening the funding prospects of NDC: This requires the effective implementation of the already developed communication strategy, carrying out mapping of donors and launching an aggressive fundraising campaign, diversifying funding sources, tapping on local funding, encouraging the social responsibility of the private sector, and creating an endowment fund that would assist in covering some of NDC's operational costs.

### Externally directed strategic actions:

1. Expanding provision of integrated financial and technical support to NGOs: This encompasses further development of the Grants and Capacity Building Program, providing technical support to NGOs and their umbrella organizations. At once it increases the number of benefiting organizations, further developing the Code of Conduct Program and increasing the technical support provided to its implementation. also It also includes increase the financing of job creation programs - particularly in Gaza Strip, and establishing a program that would respond to arising emergencies. Finally this action includes intensifying the support to the NGOs in Jerusalem, especially youth organizations.
2. Encouraging information sharing, coordination, and networking among the NGOs: This would comprise of activating the NGO Coalition in order to represent the sector as a whole. This action also entails promoting sharing of information and experiences between and about the NGOs through expanding and further developing the "Masader" program. Also it consists of supporting programs and activities that enhance sectoral coordination and joint implementation among the NGOs, carrying out policy research and facilitating policy dialogue among the NGOs – and with development partners – and advocating for NGOs needs.
3. Encouraging the establishment of partnership relations between NGOs and other development partners: This action entails promoting coordination and joint implementation between the NGO sector and public and private sector institutions. It will also establish twinning relationships and coordination between NDC and similar international organizations

## 6.3. Strategic Actions Framework

The following tables describe the elements of each strategic action, comprising the framework for action plans to be developed annually:

STRATEGIC ACTION No. 1 INSTITUTIONAL AND COMPETENCE BUILDING OF NDC		
<b>Current Status</b>	Involvement of Board of Directors in NDC's work is modest; relatively high turnover of staff; internal procedures and regulations are still evolving and not stabilized; NDC's management information system (MIS) is not fully comprehensive.	
<b>Assumptions</b>	The existing governance and management structures, as well as internal procedures and regulations, provide sufficient bases for streamlining, updating, and consolidation.	
<b>Objective</b>	NDC is more competent, more efficient, and a more professional organization with a relatively stable staff.	
<b>Indicators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Staff competencies are improved.</li> <li>- Staff turnover is reduced to acceptable levels and core team maintained.</li> <li>- Internal processes are streamlined and consolidated.</li> <li>- Board of Directors is actively carrying out its role.</li> </ul>	
Intermediate results	Completion Date	Responsibility
Basic and professional skills of the staff are enhanced.	Ongoing	Finance and Administration Dep.
Organizational structure and job descriptions are clearly defined and responsive to NDC's needs.		Finance and Administration Dep.
Improved Staff Performance Evaluation system.		Finance and Administration Dep.
Integration of new staff is facilitated and their commitment to NDC is enhanced (by using the "Integration and Orientation Kit").	Ongoing	Management
Attractive salary and incentive package to attract and maintain qualified staff is developed.		Management
Internal manuals (e.g., the Operations Manual, Finance and Administration Manual of Procedures, Board Manual) are reviewed and updated.		Finance and Administration Dep.
MIS system includes all programs and activities.		Finance and Administration Dep.
Board of Directors and its subcommittees are more active and effective.	Ongoing	Management

**STRATEGIC ACTION No. 2  
BROADENING THE FUNDING PROSPECTS OF NDC**

Current Status	High dependency on relatively few external funding sources threatens future sustainability of NDC	
Assumptions	Diversifying funding would reduce NDC's vulnerability	
Objective	NDC is more sustainable financially	
Indicators	NDC has secured and diversified funding	
Intermediate results	Completion Date	Responsibility
Financing policy for NDC is drafted		Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
Mapping of donors' priorities is annually updated	Annually	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
NGO Sector Strategy revised		Sector Development Unit
NGOs sector's priorities are regularly updated	Annually	Sector Development Unit
Annual fundraising plans are developed	Annually	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
New funding sources are tapped with special emphasis on Arab sources	Ongoing	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
Share of local financing is steadily increasing	Ongoing	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
NDC's visibility is enhanced among the stakeholders	Ongoing	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
Endowment Fund for NDC is established		Management

**STRATEGIC ACTION No. 3**  
**EXPANDING THE PROVISION OF INTEGRATED FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO THE NGOs**

<b>Current Status</b>	NDC provides grants and diverse technical assistance and training to enhance the capacities of individual NGOs and their umbrella organizations.	
<b>Assumptions</b>	There is an increasing need for NDC's financial and technical support to NGOs. New additional funding for NDC is available.	
<b>Objective:</b>	NGOs' services are expanded to cover the poor, marginalized and vulnerable groups and areas.	
<b>Indicator(s):</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- An increased number of beneficiary NGOs receiving NDC's financial and technical support.</li> <li>- The expansion of NDC's geographic coverage of financial and technical support.</li> <li>- A increase in the percentage of marginalized groups (women, youth, and elderly) targeted by NDC's programs.</li> <li>- An increase in annually disbursed grants.</li> </ul>	
<b>Intermediate results</b>	<b>Completion Date</b>	<b>Responsibility</b>
The grants and capacity building program is expanded.	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit
Priority areas for grants and their types (empowerment grants, partnership grants, NGOs-LGUs partnership grants, innovation grants, etc.) are regularly reviewed and updated.	Annually	Grants Programs Unit
Guidelines and manuals for developing NGO's internal administration and management capacities (strategic planning, project management, financial management, procurement, human resources management, monitoring and evaluation, sustainability, fundraising, etc.) are drafted and disseminated.	Ongoing	Sector Development Unit
Technical support to the implementation of Code of Conduct is increased.	Ongoing	Sector Support Unit
Increased financial and technical support to Jerusalem and Gaza Strip NGOs .	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit
Increased support to NGOs implementing human rights and governance programs.	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit
Financial support is provided to establish new organizations with innovative ideas.	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit

**STRATEGIC ACTION No. 4  
ENABLING INFORMATION SHARING, COORDINATION, AND NETWORKING**

Current Status	NGO sector has modest influence on national policy formulation.
Assumptions	Coordination and networking among NGOs would eventually lead to a more organized and effective NGO sector.
Objectives	- A more effective and organized NGO sector that is a more active partner in the formulation and implementation of national policies and plans.
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthened NGO Coalitions and thematic networks.</li> <li>- More consensus among NGOs concerning development needs and an achieved vision.</li> </ul>

Intermediate results	Completion Date	Responsibility
“Masader” portal is further developed and its membership expanded.	Ongoing	Sector Development Unit
Enhanced experience and information sharing between NGOs.	Ongoing	Sector Development Unit
Establishment of regular dialogue and information sharing platforms between NGOs and various development partners (like the public and private sectors and the donor community).	Ongoing	Sector Development Unit
NGOs and their thematic and umbrella organizations participate actively in developing both sectoral national strategies and the formulation of the Palestinian National Plan.	Ongoing	Sector Development Unit
A thematic working group between the NGOs and main donors is established to facilitate aid prioritization and coordination of assistance priorities.		Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
Donors’ policies are more and more receptive to suggestions and proposals of NDC and NGOs’.	Ongoing	Resource Mobilization and Communication Unit
Related policy research is carried out within the NGO sector and results are disseminated.		Sector Development Unit
A conference is held on special NGO issues.		Sector Development Unit
Enhanced relationship established between NDC and public sector institutions, especially with MOPAD and MOI.	Ongoing	Management
Mechanisms are in place for tapping into private sector financing through promoting its social responsibility		Sector Development Unit



STRATEGIC ACTION No. 5 ENCOURAGING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN THE NGOs AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS		
Current Status	There are few experiences in joint implementation and partnerships between NGOs and private/public sector's institutions or local authorities.	
Assumptions	Joint implementation and partnerships between NGOs and private/public sector's institutions would render a more efficient, effective, NGO sector.	
Objective:	The NGO sector, the public sector, and the private sector collectively become more active partners in the development of Palestinian society.	
Indicator(s):	– Partnerships and joint implementation mechanisms between NGOs and the private or public sector's institutions are created.	
Intermediate results	Completion Date	Responsibility
Partnerships between the NGOs and private sector institutions and joint implementation of projects are piloted and experiences disseminated.	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit
A joint NGO/private sector program is institutionalized in NDC.		Grants Programs Unit
NGOs implement programs/projects jointly with public sector institutions and local authorities.	Ongoing	Grants Programs Unit
Establish "twinning" relation between NDC and a similar international organization.		Management

## 7. Monitoring, Evaluation and Updating of the Strategic Plan

The Strategic Plan provides the framework for developing annual plans and budgets. The existing results based M&E system, once expanded to cover all programs and activities, would be used to monitor the implementation of both, annual plans and the Strategic Plan, which comprises of the following components:

1. Annual plans (individual units and NDC as a whole)
2. Annual Budget
3. Monthly review of expenses/inputs (monthly budget variance analysis report)
4. Field visits reports (providing input to activity monitoring)
5. Monthly meetings of units (activity monitoring)
6. Quarterly progress reports from beneficiaries
7. Completion reports from beneficiaries
8. Quarterly updated rolling plan of the units: Quarterly review of achievements at the output level and planning for the new quarter (Quarterly progress reports of units)
9. Quarterly Financial Monitoring Report issued and submitted to donors
10. Mid-year budget review/adjustment
11. Quarterly reports to donors (e.g., World Bank, AFD, and Welfare)
12. Semi-annual review of outcomes (reporting to donors)
13. Annual review and update of the strategic plan: assessment of achievements at the outcome level and review of impact level (annual report)
14. Annual externally audited financial report
15. Annual performance evaluation of the staff
16. Mid-term review of programs (depending on Donor's requirement)
17. Final evaluation of programs
18. Near the end of third year, the Strategic Plan will be evaluated and new one developed.

## Appendix I

### Brief Outline of Strategic Planning Workshop

The strategic planning workshop was divided into the following main components:

1. Introduction to strategic planning process: in which the basic principles of strategic planning process were introduced. The aim of this session was to set an appropriate working atmosphere by shifting from a 'normal' to a 'learning' mode.
2. Historical mapping: this aimed at revisiting NDC's set of values and reviewing the specific historical milestones or incidents that shaped its existing specific character. In this session, the group followed a stylized "looking-backward" technique in order to prepare a base for devising strategies that would improve the work of NDC.
3. Existing situation analysis: Using the SWOT analysis technique, the participants collectively identified key issues to be addressed in the strategic plan. These key issues, in effect, represent 'their' priorities for change. In this way, it became clear to all participants what needs to be changed to reach future goals. The participants were invited to share and discuss among themselves the different issues in a form. They discovered key issues tend to build on one another and concentrate on a particular segment rather than getting randomly dispersed. This then became the basis of NDC's strategic plan.
4. Realistic vision for the future: In this session, participants drew a 'common future picture' of NDC as related to the already identified issues.
5. Analysis of major obstacles and constraints: In this exercise, participants worked back from their ideal future vision to the current realities of today, listing the key obstacles and constraints that need to be overcome in terms of both personal and institutional changes along the way. The categorization of problems helped develop a common view of problems among the participants. It also helped them see more clearly who owns a particular problem and what individual and institutional behavior would need changing to fix it.
6. Identification of strategic directions and strategic elements: In this stage, decisions were made in pragmatic terms about the directions and priorities for action needed to change the current situation and reach the envisioned future.

Throughout the workshop, many tools were used to ensure maximum participation and involvement. These include: historical mapping, SWOT analysis, group discussions, brain storming, case studies and portraits, categorization, classification and reflection, process documentation, and critical incident analysis, in addition to the presentation and review of some secondary sources and studies.

